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Abstract 
Examples of reasoning problems such as the twins problem and poison paradox have been 
proposed by legal scholars to demonstrate the limitations of probability theory in legal 
reasoning. Specifically, such problems are intended to show that use of probability theory 
results in legal paradoxes. As such, these problems have been a powerful detriment to the 
use of probability theory – and particularly Bayes theorem – in the law. However, the examples 
only lead to ‘paradoxes’ under an artificially constrained view of probability theory and the use 
of the so-called likelihood ratio, in which multiple related hypotheses and pieces of evidence 
are squeezed into a single hypothesis variable and a single evidence variable. When the 
distinct relevant hypotheses and evidence are described properly in a causal model (a 
Bayesian network), the paradoxes vanish. In addition to the twins problem and poison 
paradox, we demonstrate this for the food tray example, the abuse paradox and the small 
town murder problem. Moreover, the resulting Bayesian networks provide a powerful 
framework for legal reasoning.   
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1 Introduction 
The idea that there are fundamental limitations to the use of probability theory within the law 
was formalised in the work of Cohen (Cohen, 1977). Further concerns, with a special focus 
on the use of Bayesian probability and the likelihood ratio in the law, have been described in 
work such as (Park et al., 2010), (Engel, 2012), (Pardo, 2013) and (Sullivan, 2016). This body 
of work includes numerous examples of puzzles intended to demonstrate that probabilistic 
reasoning leads to errors or ‘paradoxes’ in the legal context. While work such as (Allen, 1993), 
(Allen & Carriquiry, 1997), (Dawid, 1987), (Fenton, Berger, Lagnado, Neil, & Hsu, 2013), 
(Lempert, 1977) (Picinali, 2012), (Redmayne, 2009), (Schweizer, 2013) and (Schwartz & 
Sober, 2017) have addressed and contested some of these so-called legal paradoxes, they 
continue to play a role in the strong resistance to the idea of using Bayesian probability in the 
law (Hastie, 2019). While it is primarily legal scholars involved in such discussions, there is no 
doubt that the concerns raised have influenced judges and practicing lawyers; for example,  
the paradoxes are discussed in standard textbooks on criminal evidence such as (Roberts & 
Zuckerman, 2010) and underlie judgements against the use of Bayes in the law such as in 
cases discussed in (Fenton, Neil, & Berger, 2016). 
Our objective is to show that, not only is it incorrect to conclude that the puzzles and 
‘paradoxes’ demonstrate probability theory is incompatible with legal reasoning, but also that 
a causal Bayesian modelling approach is naturally compatible.   
We will show that what is common in all of the example problems – and this is what creates 
an apparent paradox – is a failure to disentangle distinct hypotheses and pieces of evidence. 
The urge to couch a problem in terms of a single Boolean hypothesis H (guilty/not guilty) and 
a single (but consolidated) set of evidence E is a natural response to the widespread use of 
the likelihood ratio as a measure of probative value of evidence, but it is this artificial 
simplification of the underlying problem that creates the so-called paradoxes. In Section 2 we 
summarise this likelihood ratio approach and explain why, when there are more than two 
hypotheses or conditionally dependent pieces of evidence, a simplistic application of the 
likelihood ratio approach causes problems. We explain how a causal model - a Bayesian 
network (BN) - linking the hypotheses and evidence can help resolve these issues. In Section 
3 we review the discussion in (Park et al., 2010) in order to highlight the range of concerns 
and misunderstandings surrounding the use of Bayes and the law.  In the subsequent sections 
we consider the main paradoxes and show that, in each case, by disentangling relevant 
hypotheses and evidence in a causal BN model, it is possible to ‘’resolve’ the paradoxes and 
avoid the underlying misunderstandings. Indeed, we demonstrate that the BN approach 
actually strengthens the argument for using Bayesian probability to evaluate evidence in a 
legal context in the law. Further examples are provided in the Supplementary material. 
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2 The likelihood ratio, its limitations and the need for Bayesian 
networks 
We start by briefly introducing some terminology and assumptions that we will use throughout 
(for more detailed discussion, see (Fenton et al., 2016)). A hypothesis is a statement which 
we seek to evaluate. In crime cases, typically two hypotheses are considered: one related to 
the standpoint of the defendant, and the other related to the standpoint of the prosecutor. For 
example, suppose that a DNA trace was found at the crime scene, and that a defendant has 
been arrested. For this situation, these standpoints can be summarized with “the defendant is 
the source of DNA found at the crime scene” and “the defendant is not the source of DNA 
found at the crime scene”. The Bayesian network representation for this hypothesis pair and 
evidence is shown in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1 Causal view of evidence. This is a very simple example of a Bayesian Network (BN) 
In the graphical representation in Figure 1, an arrow is drawn from the hypothesis node to the 
evidence node. The direction of this arrow indicates the dependency relation, for example due 
to causality: H being true (resp. false) can cause the evidence E to be true (resp. false).  
Within this framework, the evidential value of an observation can be summarized as a 
likelihood ratio. The probability of observing the evidence given that a particular hypothesis is 
true is referred to as the likelihood of that observation given the hypothesis, i.e.  
Pr(evidence | prosecution hypothesis) 
The ratio of the two likelihoods is called the likelihood ratio (LR; (Aitken, Roberts, & Jackson, 
2010)). 
𝐿𝑅 =
Pr(evidence | prosecution hypothesis)
Pr (evidence |defence hypothesis)
 
A LR equal to 1 corresponds to evidence that is equally likely under both hypotheses, i.e. in 
isolation, it is "irrelevant” for distinguishing between these two hypotheses. A LR greater than 
1 corresponds with evidence that it is more likely when the prosecution hypothesis is true than 
when the defence hypothesis is true. Similarly, a LR smaller than 1 corresponds to evidence 
that is more likely when the defence hypothesis is true than when the prosecution hypothesis 
is true. 
In order to determine the value of the LR for the example from Figure 1, two questions need 
to be answered. (1) How likely is it to observe that the DNA profile of the defendant matches 
the DNA profile obtained from the crime stain given that the defendant is the source of DNA 
found at the crime scene, and, (2) How likely is it to observe that the DNA profile of the 
defendant matches the DNA profile obtained from the crime stain given that the defendant is 
not the source of DNA found at the crime scene. For illustrative purposes, assume the LR is 
equal to 1000. 
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𝐿𝑅 =
Pr(evidence | prosecution hypothesis)
Pr (evidence | defence hypothesis)
=  
1
1
1000⁄
= 1000 
While the likelihood provides a measure of the probative value of the evidence in 
discriminating the defence hypothesis against the prosecution hypothesis, central to legal 
reasoning is the probability of a hypothesis: once we observe the evidence, we need to 
evaluate whether the defence or prosecution hypothesis is more likely. This probability of a 
hypothesis being true given the evidence is called the posterior probability. Bayes Theorem 
can be used to update prior beliefs regarding the prosecution and defence hypotheses into 
the posterior probability using the likelihood ratio. The odds form of Bayes theorem is, 
posterior odds = prior odds × likelihood ratio 
The prior odds, in terms of probabilities are equal to, 
Pr (prosecution hypothesis)
Pr (defence hypothesis)
 
Assigning these prior probabilities is considered to be within the realm of the trier of fact, and 
correspond to answering how likely these hypotheses are prior to considering any evidence. 
These can, for the example from Figure 1, be based on an estimate regarding the number of 
people that could conceivably be the donor of the DNA found at the crime scene. If it is 
assumed that 100 people, including the defendant, could conceivably be the donor of the DNA 
found at the crime scene, and all of them are equally likely to be the donor, the prior 
probabilities are: 
Pr(prosecution hypothesis) = 0.01 
Pr(defence hypothesis) = 0.99 
Hence, the prior odds are equal to, 
Pr (prosecution hypothesis)
Pr (defence hypothesis)
=
0.01
0.99
=
1
99
 
And the odds form of Bayes Theorem tells us, 
posterior odds =
1
99
× 1000 =
1000
99
 
In this case, where the hypotheses are exhaustive and mutually exclusive, the posterior 
probabilities can be retrieved from the posterior odds. 
Pr(prosecution hypothesis|evidence) =
1000
99⁄
1 + 1000 99⁄
= 0.91 
And, similarly, 
Pr(defence hypothesis|evidence) = 0.09 
It is important to note that, where the hypotheses are exhaustive and mutually exclusive it also 
follows from Bayes theorem (Fenton et al., 2016) that: 
 The posterior probabilities of the hypotheses are unchanged from the priors if the 𝐿𝑅 =
1. In other words 
 Pr(prosecution hypothesis|evidence) =  Pr (prosecution hypothesis) when 𝐿𝑅 = 1. 
 The posterior probability of the prosecution hypothesis is greater than its prior if 𝐿𝑅 >
1. 
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 The posterior probability of the defence hypothesis is greater than its prior if 𝐿𝑅 < 1. 
Hence, for exhaustive and mutually exclusive hypotheses, the LR is a genuine measure of 
probative value of the evidence in the sense that it really does tell us whether the evidence 
leads to a change in the posterior probabilities of the hypotheses. The fact that this is NOT 
true if the hypotheses are not exhaustive and mutually exclusive is important in the subsequent 
discussion.     
 
Now suppose there are more than two alternative hypotheses. For example, suppose, it is 
assumed that the brother of the defendant is among the 100 possible donors of the DNA trace. 
Then the hypothesis H “Source of DNA found at crime scene” should have three states: (1) 
defendant, (2) brother of defendant and (3) unrelated other. Since close relatives are more 
likely to share a particular DNA profile than unrelated people, these relatives should be 
considered separately when evaluating the evidence in situations where there is reason to 
believe that they are among the possible donors. The following probabilities are assigned, 
again based on the assumption that there are 100 possible donors where the defendant and 
his brother are part of this group, 
Pr(defendant) = 0.01 
Pr(brother of defendant) = 0.01 
Pr(unrelated other) = 0.98 
Subsequently, one needs the probability of observing the particular DNA profile given that the 
brother of the defendant was the donor. Here, it is assumed that it is 100 times more likely to 
observe the particular DNA profile when the donor was a sibling of the defendant than when 
the donor was an unrelated other, i.e. the likelihoods are, 
Pr(evidence | defendant) = 1 
Pr(evidence | brother of defendant) = 0.1 
Pr(evidence | unrelated other) = 0.001 
Now, because the defence hypothesis can be regarded as a combination of two sub-
hypotheses, e.g. the brother of the defendant or an unrelated other is the source of the DNA 
found at the crime scene, the corresponding prior probabilities become part of the likelihood 
ratio. This is already something that can easily be overlooked, for examples see (de Zoete & 
Sjerps, 2018). 
Pr(evidence|prosecution hypothesis) = 1 
Pr(evidence|defence hypothesis) 
        = (Pr(evidence|brother of defendant) × Pr(brother of defendant)
+ Pr(evidence|unrelated other) × Pr(unrelated other))  
×
1
Pr(defence hypothesis)
 
        =
0.1 × 0.01 + 0.001 × 0.98
0.01 + 0.98
 
       = 0.002 
 
𝐿𝑅 =
Pr(evidence | prosecution hypothesis)
Pr (evidence |defence hypothesis)
=  
1
0.002
= 500 
And the posterior odds become, 
posterior odds =
1
99
× 500 =
500
99
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Again, because the hypotheses are exhaustive and mutually exclusive, the posterior 
probability for the prosecution hypothesis can be retrieved from the posterior odds1. 
Pr(prosecution hypothesis|evidence) =
500
99⁄
1 + 500 99⁄
= 0.83 
Similarly, 
Pr(brother of defendant|evidence) =
50
549⁄
1 + 50 549⁄
= 0.08 
and, 
Pr(unrelated other |evidence) =
49
550⁄
1 + 49 550⁄
= 0.08  
Although it is still possible to perform these calculations manually, it is substantially more 
challenging now that the prior probabilities for the sub-hypotheses of the defence hypothesis 
are explicitly present in the likelihood ratio. When additional pieces of evidence are evaluated 
in conjunction to the DNA evidence manually calculating these probabilities becomes 
practically infeasible.  As an example, consider the situation presented in the BN in Figure 2 
where, in addition to the DNA evidence, there is an eyewitness that claims that the brother 
was out of town on the day of the crime. Several dedicated software solutions (Agena Ltd, 
2019; Hojsgaard, 2012; Hugin A/S, 2018; University of Pittsburg, 2018) have been developed 
that can help with constructing Bayesian networks and, subsequently, performing calculations 
with them.  Using such a software solution, the posterior probability that the defendant is the 
source of the DNA found at the crime scene is determined to be 0.90.  
                                                             
1 For this particular purpose, a generic formula can be used to retrieve the posterior probability, 
Pr(prosecution hypothesis|evidence) =
1
1+
1
10
+
98
1000
= 0.83. See (Balding & Steele, 2015). 
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Figure 2 Bayesian network for two pieces of evidence with conditional probability tables 
Furthermore, the likelihood ratio of the combined evidence can be retrieved by dividing the 
posterior odds by the prior odds (which are also computed automatically in the BN tool). For 
the example from Figure 2, this corresponds with, 
𝐿𝑅 =
posterior odds
prior odds
=
0.9016
(1 − 0.9016)⁄
0.01
0.99⁄
= 907 
For illustrative purposes, the same results are manually derived in the Supplementary 
material, Section 1.1.  In all of the BN examples that follow the probability calculations are 
performed using (Agena Ltd, 2019).  
We believe that much of resistance to the use of Bayes is due to confusion, over-simplification 
and over-emphasis of the role of the LR. Namely, as can be seen from the examples presented 
in this paper, sceptics often present the LR in a simplistic form, e.g. What does this piece of 
evidence (in isolation) say about two (non-exhaustive) hypotheses? However, the true “power” 
of this probabilistic framework lies in the ability to take a more holistic view of the case, namely 
the hypotheses, the evidence and how they are interconnected. The issues are dealt with in 
depth in  (Fenton et al., 2013, 2016; Fenton, Neil, & Hsu, 2014). While Bayes’ Theorem and 
the LR provides a simple and natural match to intuitive legal reasoning in the case of a single 
Boolean hypothesis node H and a single piece of evidence E, practical legal arguments 
normally involve multiple hypotheses and pieces of evidence with complex causal 
dependencies. In such cases the simplistic LR approach does not provide the necessary 
overview, and this is the reason for the apparent ‘paradoxes’ described below. However, by 
using Bayesian networks to model the relevant hypotheses, evidence and causal 
dependencies it is possible to resolve the paradoxes and provide coherent and consistent 
conclusions about the probative value of evidence.  
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3 The key issues arising from the ‘Small town murder’ problem’ 
In the discussion paper Bayes Wars Redivius– An exchange (Park et al., 2010), Allen presents 
the following example (which we will refer to as the ‘small town murder’ problem) to claim that 
the LR approach does not accurately capture the concept of relevance in legal trials. 
A person accused of murder in a small town was seen driving to the small town at a 
time prior to the murder. The prosecution’s theory is that he was driving there to commit 
the murder. The defense theory is an alibi: he was driving to the town because his 
mother lives there to visit her. The probability of this evidence if he is guilty equals that 
if he is innocent, and thus the likelihood ratio is 1, and under what is suggested as the 
“Bayesian” analysis, it is therefore irrelevant. Yet, every judge in every trial courtroom 
of the country would admit it (…). And so we have a puzzle. 
Hence, specifically, the puzzle considers the problem that evidence with a likelihood ratio of 
1, which occurs when it does not favour one hypotheses (prosecution) over the other 
(defense), is labelled irrelevant. However, as Kaye pointed out in the exchange, the problem 
with this conclusion is that it makes the mistake of evaluating the evidence in isolation and 
fails to take account of the impact of the evidence on other relevant hypotheses in the case. 
In other words (as is pointed out in (Fenton et al., 2013)), for such a piece of evidence it is 
meaningless to speak of “the likelihood ratio”. The value, and therefore the degree of support, 
is dependent on one’s assumptions with regards to the considered hypotheses and 
background information.  
Much of the exchange focuses around disagreements about the notion of when evidence is 
“relevant”. From the legal perspective, evidence is relevant if it has any tendency to make a 
fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence.  
The relevance of a piece of evidence based on the LR value only refers to the relevance in 
distinguishing between the considered hypotheses, i.e. the evidence is not unequivocally 
relevant (or irrelevant), it is relevant specifically with these hypotheses in mind. Hence, 
whether a piece of evidence is “relevant” (according to the LR approach), depends on the 
standpoints of the prosecution and the defence. So, as long as there is uncertainty with 
regards to the contents of these standpoints, all evidence can be treated as potentially relevant 
and can therefore be admitted. Only in situations where one cannot recognize it as having any 
influence on the case whatsoever (e.g. there were seven trees in the street of the crime scene) 
or when the “evidence” is considered to be common knowledge that does not alter the 
narrative of the case (e.g. the defendant has brown hair) one could deem it “irrelevant” without 
knowledge of the (to be) presented standpoints. Furthermore, the notion that “if the evidence 
is a critical part of both parties’ case, it’s not relevant at all” is a simplification of the issue. 
Even though evidence could fit within both parties’ narrative, that does not mean that it is 
equally likely under both hypotheses.  
Gross presents such an example in (Park et al., 2010). 
Defendant is stopped in his car three minutes after an aborted bank robbery, 1/2 a mile 
and speeding away from the site. Prosecution says it's relevant to guilt: it shows he 
was escaping. Defendant says it is relevant to innocence: no escaping bank robber 
would speed and attract attention. I used to be a criminal defense lawyer, so I think the 
defendant's argument is quite a bit more specious than the prosecutor's. 
In other words, even though the evidence is a critical part of both parties’ case, Gross believes 
that this piece of evidence better fits with the prosecutor’s argument than the argument of the 
defense, which translates to a likelihood ratio greater than 1. However, once again, it is 
important to stress that one cannot speak of ‘the’ LR. Especially with this example, the 
evidential value of the speeding evidence is dependent on the answers to sub-questions like 
“how likely is it that a bank robber would be speeding away from a crime scene” or “was there 
a police chase going on”. Given that there most likely will be a disagreement over the 
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“answers” to such questions, it is fair to state that there cannot be a conclusive LR that defines 
the relevance of the evidence.  
Both Gross and Allen suggest that evidence, although “irrelevant” with respect to a LR of 1 
can still be relevant for the case as a whole. This is correct, mostly because pieces of evidence 
will usually have a (conditional) dependency relation with other pieces of evidence. Since the 
presented hypotheses (standpoints) will disagree on at least one aspect, it is likely that the 
relevance of a piece of evidence is not necessarily based on their evidential value with regards 
to the hypotheses “directly” but rather for establishing the evidential value of another piece. In 
other words, it is often insufficient to evaluate pieces of evidence in isolation since the 
interdependency between them says so much more. Hence, it is possible that a piece of 
evidence that, on its own, would be labelled irrelevant, i.e. a LR of 1, is relevant when 
evaluated together with another piece of evidence. We will show this in the Abuse example in 
Section 4.3 Similarly, it is possible that a piece of evidence with a very discriminating LR 
becomes “irrelevant” when evaluated together with other pieces of evidence. Consider the 
following example 
At a crime scene where a fight took place, a wall is covered with blood spatters. DNA 
profiles are obtained from multiple blood spatters, all of them match with the DNA 
profile of the defendant. Furthermore, a blood spatter analyst reports that the pattern 
was most likely caused due to an assault with a blunt object. 
For such a situation, if the prosecution’s hypothesis states that the defendant was one of the 
people present at the crime scene during the fight and the defence disputes this by stating 
that the defendant was not present at the crime scene during the fight, the DNA profiles 
evidence obtained from the blood spatters is very discriminating for establishing that the 
defendant was recently at the crime scene, and, therefore, relevant. However, for this set of 
hypotheses, the report of the blood spatter analyst, when evaluated in isolation of the other 
evidence, is irrelevant; the presence of the defendant does not change our belief in what type 
of pattern we expect to observe. Nonetheless, when evaluated together, the DNA profiles 
become relevant specifically with regards to being present during the fight due to the blood 
pattern report. Furthermore, the evidential value of additional reports on individual blood 
spatters diminishes for every added spatter. After “observing” that the first 10 matched the 
profile of the defendant, we already suspect that the 11th will do so as well. Hence, at some 
point, yet another report on the DNA profile of a blood spatter will become practically irrelevant, 
given all the other evidence, even though the piece of evidence in isolation suggests it is highly 
relevant. 
In (Park et al., 2010) Kaye suggested that BNs could help evaluate evidence to address the 
issues above. Most importantly, such a presentation forces one to evaluate the evidence on 
the basis of multiple hypotheses and the (assumed) interdependency between pieces of 
evidence and hypotheses becomes explicit. There has been much concern and debate about 
the practicalities of constructing BNs and assigning the necessary probabilities in order to 
perform calculations. This is certainly a limiting factor of bringing BNs into the courtroom. 
Furthermore, due to the fact that, potentially, there could be countless possible scenarios that 
describe what caused the declared evidence it is unlikely that all of them can be satisfyingly 
accounted for in a single model. Nonetheless, the notion that BNs will not overcome all of the 
potential hurdles of a full criminal trial is no reason for them to be disregarded as helpful tools 
in analysing situations and evidence in general. As we show later, BNs can be helpful when 
determining the relevancy of particular pieces of evidence, or highlighting what is at the core 
of an apparent paradox and, subsequently, resolving this. Also, even without specifying 
definite probabilities, a BN can help in evaluating evidence.   
As a very basic example, consider the BN in Figure 3 for the small town murder problem. Even 
without the necessary probabilities to perform calculations, the relation between hypotheses 
and evidence is apparent and, due to the very straightforward structure, it is even possible to 
formalize the relation between prior beliefs, the likelihood ratio of the evidence and the 
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posterior probabilities. For more complex situations, this can be very difficult, but theoretically 
it is possible.  
 
 
Figure 3 Very basic example of a Bayesian network for the “small town murder” problem 
Nonetheless, the key point following from the small town murder example was not satisfyingly 
resolved with the responses of Gross and Kaye (Park et al., 2010). Allen states: 
[Kaye] doesn't address the second point (…) that the same piece of evidence can 
support both guilt and innocence, making the pertinent likelihood ratio 1.0. In fact, 
many if not most trials have massively overlapping evidence. The actual differences 
between the evidentiary proffers of the opposing sides often come to only a few points, 
yet judges consistently let all this overlapping evidence in for just the reason Sam 
identifies. Thus, if the likelihood ratio approach to relevance were true in some sense, 
that means the trial judges throughout the country have been admitting massive 
amounts of irrelevant evidence.  
The notion that overlapping evidence is necessarily similar to evidence with a LR of 1 is 
incorrect. This links to the previous discussion that pieces of evidence, when evaluated in 
isolation of the other evidence could suggest that they are irrelevant when distinguishing 
between the competing hypotheses but could be highly relevant in the bigger picture.  
As the LR is determined by two hypotheses, a different hypothesis can result in a drastic 
change in the likelihood ratio. To illustrate, consider the suspect driving to town prior to the 
murder example. For the hypotheses pair Hp: Defendant (D) was in town and had the 
opportunity to kill the deceased and Hd: D was in town to visit his mother and was with her at 
the time of the murder and the evidence E: witness claims he saw defendant driving to town 
prior to murder the LR is equal to 1, since the hypotheses both state that the defendant was 
in town. However, these two hypotheses present a very restricted view of the case. Essentially, 
one is explicitly assuming that the defendant was in town when evaluating the evidence that 
a witness saw him driving to town prior to the murder. If one considers this a valid assumption, 
i.e. one firmly believes that the defendant was in town at the time of the murder, the evidence 
provides no reason for accepting either hypothesis. 
Alternatively, if the defence disputes that the defendant was in town, i.e. they present Hd: D 
was out of town, the likelihood ratio will be discriminative towards the prosecution hypothesis. 
The hypotheses presented in those hypothesis pairs are not necessarily exhaustive, i.e. it is 
possible that neither of the presented hypotheses is true. During a trial, it is not only important 
to evaluate which presented narrative is the more likely one, given the evidence. One should 
also evaluate whether the more likely narrative is probable at all. Hence, a more inclusive 
approach would consider all three hypotheses, as in Figure 4.   
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Figure 4 Defendant driving to town - exhaustive set of hypotheses 
For this BN, the node “defendant driving to town prior to murder” only serves to disentangle 
the hypotheses node into relevant sub-hypotheses and could potentially be left out. 
Nonetheless, this BN may result in yet another LR. Perhaps more importantly, because the 
evidence is evaluated based on more than two hypotheses, the prior probabilities assigned to 
these hypotheses become part of the LR, see (Aitken & Taroni, 2004; de Zoete & Sjerps, 
2018). Hence, in this instance, it is impossible to determine the value of the LR without 
specifying the prior probabilities of the hypotheses. Since it is highly uncommon that these 
prior probabilities are specified within a trial, it would usually be impossible to determine the 
value of the LR. Still, this does not imply that the LR is unfit to evaluate the “relevance” of 
evidence in legal trials. Consider, for example, the model in Figure 4, with unspecified 
probability tables as in Figure 5.  As long as the prior probability for D was out of town is 
nonzero (i.e. this scenario is not impossible prior to observing any evidence), and the LR of 
the witness statement with regards to whether the defendant was driving to town prior to the 
murder supports that he was (i.e. a LR >1), it follows that the evidence supports the 
prosecution hypothesis. Furthermore, the witness statement evidence also supports the 
statement that D was in town to visit his mother, while it decreases the probability that D was 
out of town. Hence, the evidence is relevant. 
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Figure 5 Defendant driving to town - probability tables 
The three presented models might all result in different and possibly practically indeterminable 
LR values, but they also present three different scenarios under which the evidence is 
evaluated. The relevance of a piece of evidence according to a LR approach should only be 
regarded within the narrative of the evaluated hypotheses and possibly accompanying 
evidence. Hence, for the first model in Figure 3 a LR equal to 1 should only make the witness 
statement “irrelevant” when evaluating it in isolation of other evidence with regards to 
differentiating between the “Defendant (D) was in town and had the opportunity to kill the 
deceased” and “D was in town to visit his mother and was with her at the time of the murder”. 
In several of the discussed legal “paradoxes” the observation that the LR is 1 for one set of 
hypotheses is used to label the piece of evidence as being irrelevant according to the LR 
approach. Subsequently, this conclusion is labelled paradoxical since the evidence is 
intuitively relevant for the case as a whole. For example, because the evidence is a key 
element of both the prosecution and the defense standpoints, i.e. because it either strengthens 
the belief that either of these represent what actually happened over alternative, non-
mentioned, scenarios (see for example the Twins problem in Section 4.1) or because it should 
be regarded relevant in combination with other pieces of evidence (see the Abuse paradox in 
Section 4.3).  
  
13 
 
4 Bayesian networks for probabilistic paradoxes in legal 
reasoning 
As a follow up to the discussions in (Park et al., 2010), (Pardo, 2013) argued that probabilistic 
conception of evidence produces many theoretical and practical problems and should not be 
used in the court. To illustrate, Pardo discussed a number of example problems. We review 
these problems and, in each case, identify the misunderstandings that result in the apparent 
paradox in legal reasoning. We then show that a correct representation with a Bayesian 
network avoids the paradox. Four of the problems (“Twins”, “Food tray”, “Poison” and “Abuse”) 
are reviewed here while three more (“Lottery”, “Liberal candidates” and “Typewriter” are 
worked out in a similar way and are available in the Supplementary material, Section 2. 
4.1 Twins problem 
The so-called Twins problem is stated in (Pardo, 2013) as: 
A witness testifies that someone matching the defendant’s appearance was seen 
fleeing a crime scene. The defendant claims that it was his identical twin and 
introduces evidence establishing the twin’s existence. Suppose there is no reason to 
believe the testimony distinguishes the defendant from his twin. 
Pardo notes that 
If we are comparing the likelihood of the defendant’s guilt versus his twin, then (…)  
there does not appear to be any reason to think the likelihood ratio is different from 1. 
Nevertheless, the evidence is relevant. 
And on a probabilistic interpretation of this evidence, 
Of course, the probabilist has a rejoinder as to why the evidence is also relevant under 
a probabilistic interpretation: namely, it eliminates everybody except the defendant and 
his twin, and by eliminating everyone else it thereby increases the probability the 
defendant is guilty. The rejoinder is correct—but notice the tension between this 
conclusion and the implications of the likelihood-ratio view. Although the evidence is 
relevant because it eliminates all other suspects, it technically fails to fit the likelihood-
ratio conception as soon as evidence about the twin is introduced. As soon as the twin 
evidence is introduced, the probability of the evidence, given the defendant’s guilt, is 
exactly the same as the probability of the evidence, given the defendant’s nonguilt 
(assuming this is equivalent to the probability of the twin’s guilt). If that is so, then under 
this interpretation the likelihood ratio implies that the witness’s testimony should be 
excluded as irrelevant. 
The analysis by Pardo presents a misunderstanding with how one should incorporate a 
`likelihood ratio approach’ when dealing with such evidence. This probabilistic approach 
requires clear definitions on what hypotheses are evaluated. In Pardo’s analysis, the exact 
hypotheses that are compared change multiple times. Namely, Pardo notes that the evidence 
eliminates everybody except the defendant and the twin. Hence, here three possibilities are 
considered with regards to the person fleeing the crime scene: 
1. The defendant 
2. The twin of the defendant 
3. Someone else  
However, when evaluating the eyewitness evidence, in terms of relevance, using a likelihood 
ratio approach, only two are considered. 
1. The defendant is guilty 
2. The defendant is not guilty (assuming this is equivalent to the probability of the twin’s 
guilt). 
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It is important to highlight that, as with the “small town murder problem, the notion of ‘the 
likelihood ratio’ as described by Pardo is at the core of the misunderstanding.  Indeed, for 
distinguishing between the twin and the defendant, the LR is 1 and the evidence is irrelevant. 
However, it is incorrect to therefore conclude that the evidence is irrelevant for the case as a 
whole. The LR only allows one to distinguish between the associated hypotheses. In the twin 
example, the evidence is relevant because it distinguishes between people that look like the 
defendant and people who do not. Hence, by explicitly incorporating other people in the 
analysis, the LR will differ from 1 and hence, be relevant when distinguishing between these 
hypotheses.  
If we ignore details such as whether the witness was accurate, whether people other than the 
twins would match the same description, and whether fleeing the scene is the same as guilty 
(our later numeric example does consider a Bayesian network where these are taken into 
account), then a Bayesian Network representation of the problem is the two node network 
shown in Figure 6. 
 
Figure 6 Simple formulation of twins problem 
In this analysis, the possibility that ‘someone else’ committed the crime is not ruled out. For 
illustration purposes equal probabilities are assigned to each of the states of H, i.e. 1/3 each. 
The conditional probability table of the evidence node is defined as shown in Table 1. 
 
 
Table 1 CPT for evidence node E: Person matching defendant’s appearance seen fleeing crime scene given H 
(“person who committed the crime”) 
 
For this model, the prior probabilities for the different hypotheses are updated as in Table 2, 
H: person who 
committed the 
crime 
defendant twin someone else 
true 1 1 0 
false  0 0 1 
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Table 2 Prior and posterior probabilities for simplified twin example, N=3 
 
 
Crucially, this model presents the following (non-paradoxical and consistent) facts: 
1. The evidence does not help to distinguish the guilt of the defendant and the twin since 
the likelihood ratio (see Table 1): 
Pr (𝐸|Defendant committed the crime)
Pr (𝐸|twin committed the crime)
= 1 
Hence, the posterior odds between of defendant guilty and twin guilty are equal to 
the prior odds. 
2. However, the likelihood ratio for the exhaustive pair of hypotheses “defendant guilty” 
and “defendant not guilty” is easily determined by dividing the posterior odds by the 
prior odds (see Table 2, the same result is derived in Supplementary material, Section 
1.2). 
𝐿𝑅 =
1
2
1
2
⁄
1
3
2
3
⁄
= 2, 
which confirms that the evidence is relevant (since the LR is not 1) for this set of 
hypotheses. More specifically, the evidence does support the hypothesis that the 
defendant is guilty. This is also confirmed by the fact that the posterior probability for 
“defendant committed the crime” increases compared to the prior probability from 0.33 
to 0.50.  
So, while the evidence is not ‘probative’ in distinguishing between whether the defendant or 
their twin committed the crime it certainly is probative in distinguishing between the defendant 
committing the crime or the defending being innocent. And the model shows both of these 
assertions. Note that, especially for more complicated situations, expressing the likelihood 
ratio as a formula (see Supplementary material, Section 1.2) of all the relevant probabilities 
H: person who committed 
the crime 
Prior probability / Pr(H) Posterior probability / 
Pr(H|E) 
defendant 1/3 ½ 
twin 1/3 ½ 
someone else 1/3 0  
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will become practically infeasible. Instead we use the Bayesian network tool and simply divide 
posterior and prior odds.  
A Bayesian network representation can be used to include other uncertainties associated with 
such a case. For example, the Bayesian network in Figure 7, incorporates the accuracy of the 
witness, the size of the offender population as a parameter to determine the prior probabilities 
for the different hypotheses and the reliability of the evidence that establishes that the 
defendant has a twin. 
 
Figure 7 Bayesian network for twin example 
When using the probability assignments from Table 3 for the conditional probability tables, the 
prior probability and posterior probabilities are as in Table 4. By setting both the “appearance 
of person fleeing the crime scene” to “as defendant” and “evidence that defendant has a twin” 
to “true” the posterior probabilities are obtained using a Bayesian network tool. By dividing the 
posterior odds and the prior odds, the likelihood ratio of the combined evidence can be 
retrieved. In this case, the LR is approximately 42.  
 
 
Table 3 Probability assignments for Bayesian network from Figure 7 
Parameter Assignment  
size of offender population 1000 
𝑷𝒓(defendant has a twin) 0.01 
𝑷𝒓(similar appearance as defendant | someone else fled the crime scene) 0.02 
𝑷𝒓(twin evidence | twin exists) 1.00 
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𝑷𝒓(twin evidence | twin does not exist) 0.05 
𝑷𝒓(witness accurate) 0.85 
 
 
Table 4 Probability assignments for Bayesian network from Figure 12 
H: person who 
committed the crime 
Prior probability  (Pr(H)) Posterior probability (Pr(H|E)) 
Defendant 0.1% 4.07% 
Twin 0.001% 0.68% 
Someone else 99.899% 95.25% 
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4.2 Food tray example 
The following example based on People v. Johnson presented in (Allen, Kunhs, Swift, 
Schawartz, & Pardo, 2011) and discussed in (Pardo, 2013) further extends the need to 
evaluate the evidence with regards to a bigger set of uncertain events. 
The defendant, an inmate at a maximum-security prison, was charged with two counts 
of battery on prison guards. The charges arose from an altercation between the 
defendant and guards after the defendant refused to return a food tray in his cell. The 
prosecution’s theory was that the defendant battered the officers when they opened 
the cell door to retrieve the tray. The defendant testified that one of the guards rushed 
in and began hitting him first, and his attorney argued that, even if the defendant made 
contact first with the officer, the defendant was acting in self-defense. 
(…) The attorneys discussed (…) that the defendant had not received a package sent 
to him by his family, and that after several weeks and several attempts to speak with 
a sergeant about it, the defendant refused to return his food tray. (…) Each side used 
this evidence to support its competing theory: (1) the defendant was frustrated and 
angry about not receiving the package, withheld his tray, and charged the guard, and 
(2) the defendant was frustrated about not receiving the package, withheld the tray to 
get a sergeant’s attention about the matter, and in response the guards attacked him 
(to retaliate or punish him for this behaviour).   
Pardo notes (Pardo, 2013), 
The evidence does not appear to distinguish between the two theories; […] there is no 
reason to believe that this evidence supports one theory over the other. In other words, 
the likelihood ratio is 1:1. Under the likelihood-ratio theory, the evidence is irrelevant 
(and a fortiori has no probative value), and, thus, should have been excluded. 
This example highlights a limitation of the simple likelihood ratio approach, which considers 
only one piece of evidence at one time based on one uncertain event, like in the Bayesian 
network of Figure 8. In particular, the evidence, that the defendant did not receive a package, 
does not reject either of the theories on its own. When this evidence is considered in 
conjuncture with other possible pieces of evidence, however, the evidence can provide 
stronger support to one of the theories. To illustrate, see the Bayesian network proposed in 
Figure 9. 
 
Figure 8 Simple Bayesian network for foodtray example 
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Figure 9 Bayesian network for the foodtray example 
This network is a representation of the defendant’s and guards’ theories. This network has 10 
nodes, indicating that 10 pieces of facts should be examined to validate the theory: for 
example, the location of the parcel, and whether there is malice among the guards against the 
prisoner. All of these, together with the evidence that the prisoner did withhold his tray and a 
fight started, influence the belief with regards to who started the fight. For example, if one is 
assigning a very high probability to the guard having malice against the prisoner, this will 
increase the belief that they withheld the parcel, that the prisoner is frustrated because of that 
and therefore withholds the tray. Through all of this, it will increase the probability that the 
guard started the fight. Again, establishing a concrete value of the likelihood ratio is practically 
infeasible. First of all, it requires one to assign probabilities to all of the nodes, and furthermore, 
one should unanimously agree that the model from Figure 9 exactly captures the  situation. 
Nonetheless, the model shows that the evidential value of “prisoner withholds tray” with 
regards to who started the fight depends on a whole range of uncertain events and that it is 
practically impossible that one’s combined beliefs in these will result in a likelihood ratio of 1. 
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Furthermore, because answers to the questions represented by nodes will presumably be 
discussed in a trial, i.e. “was a parcel sent?”, it is impossible to assign the evidential value of 
“prisoner withholds tray” before the actual trial. 
Importantly, an interaction of these facts can help us to distinguish the defendant’s and guards’ 
theories. If it is established, for example, that the guards generally hold malice against 
prisoners, then the evidence that the defendant did not receive the package implies malice 
against the defendant among the guards. Hence, this evidence provides a stronger support 
for the defendant’s theory than the guards’. Therefore, by highlighting a limitation of a simple, 
straightforward, likelihood ratio approach (as in Figure 8), this example suggests that a more 
elaborate probabilistic approach is necessary. The limitation can be overcome with Bayesian 
networks. 
The Bayesian network representation allows for a more careful examination of the influence 
of some probability assignments on the question of interest, i.e. who started the fight. For 
example, how does uncertainty about whether the parcel was sent in the first place affect the 
probability that the defendant was the one starting the fight? In Table 5 two different probability 
assignments are given representing two different “stories”. In the first probability assignment, 
it is assumed that it is very likely that the parcel was sent and, similarly, that there is a malice 
against the prisoner. In the second, an opposite scenario is assumed. Ideally these (prior) 
probability assignments are based on further evidence, e.g. statements from other inmates or 
a paper trail for the parcel. The posterior probability given the Bayesian network representation 
from Figure 9 that the defendant started the fight for the first set of probability assignments is 
19%. In the second scenario this posterior probability is 74%. Assigning fixed, final, 
probabilities to these events can be practically impossible, and any assignment can be 
contested on the value, the underlying evidence and reasoning or even on whether the 
underlying uncertainty can be captured as a single probability.  Hence, one should not focus 
solely on the resulting posterior probabilities but concentrate on the model structure and the 
fact that the “relevance” of a piece of evidence is based on a much larger set of (unknown) 
events. Even though one can criticize the structure, the probability assignments and the 
considered set of evidence, the fact that one cannot simply regard the “prisoner withholds 
tray” evidence as irrelevant evidence with a LR of 1 because it fits both stories is clear from 
the network structure. Furthermore, a “sensitivity analysis” can be run on a Bayesian network 
structure like the one in Figure 9. Such an analysis provides insight with regards to the more 
influential probability assignments or evidence nodes.  
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Table 5 Probability assignments for Foodtray example 
Parameter Probability 
assignment - 1 
Probability 
assignment - 2 
𝑷𝒓(parcel sent) 0.9 0.1 
𝑷𝒓(malice against prisoner) 0.9 0.1 
𝑷𝒓(prisoner thinks parcel was sent | parcel sent) 1.0 0.9 
𝑷𝒓(prisoner thinks parcel was sent | parcel not sent) 0.0 0.1 
𝑷𝒓(parcel lost | parcel sent) 0.1 0.1 
𝑷𝒓(parcel withheld | parcel sent, malice) 0.8 0.8 
𝑷𝒓(parcel withheld | parcel sent, no malice) 0.1 0.1 
𝑷𝒓(inquires about parcel | parcel not with prisoner) 0.9 0.9 
𝑷𝒓(inquiry answered |  malice) 0.1 0.1 
𝑷𝒓(frustrated |  inquiry not answered, parcel not with prisoner) 0.9 0.9 
𝑷𝒓(frustrated |  inquiry answered, parcel not with prisoner) 0.5 0.5 
𝑷𝒓(withholds tray |  inquiry answered, not frustrated) 0.0 0.0 
𝑷𝒓(withholds tray |  inquiry not answered, not frustrated) 0.1 0.1 
𝑷𝒓(withholds tray |  inquiry answered, frustrated) 0.5 0.5 
𝑷𝒓(withholds tray |  inquiry not answered, frustrated) 0.9 0.9 
𝑷𝒓(prisoner starts fight | withholds tray, malice against prisoner) 0.2 0.2 
𝑷𝒓(prisoner starts fight | withholds tray, no malice against prisoner) 1.0 1.0 
Posterior probability – prisoner starts fight 19% 74% 
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4.3 Abuse example 
This example was originally presented in (John William Strong, Kenneth S. Broun, George E. 
Dix, Edward J. Imwinkelried, & D. H. Kaye, 1999) and concerns ``a behavioural pattern said 
to be characteristic of abused children'' (also of relevance to this example is (Lyon & Koehler, 
1996)). Once again, a likelihood ratio of 1 is at the root of the paradox. However, for this 
example, similar to the Poison example presented in Section 4.4 the apparent paradox is due 
to evaluating the evidence in isolation contrary to a combined evaluation. 
If research established that the behaviour is equally common among abused and non-
abused children, then its likelihood ratio would be 1, and evidence of that pattern would 
not be probative of abuse'' (…) And if it were a thousand times more common among 
abused children, its probative value would be far greater. 
Pardo notes (Pardo, 2013) 
(…) Even if the behaviour is equally common among both groups of children, it might 
nevertheless be highly probative in a given case if, for example, abused children 
exhibiting this behaviour also possess, and non-abused children lack, an additional 
characteristic and the particular child at issue possesses (or lacks) this characteristic 
The probabilistic fallacy here is that one should not evaluate the evidence sequentially but 
simultaneously. This fallacy can be exposed by structuring the problem and evaluating the 
evidence using a Bayesian network. Furthermore, Pardo recognizes a reference class 
problem: 
(…) the probative value may nevertheless be minimal if the child possesses (or lacks) 
an additional characteristic that places the child in the group of non-abused children 
who exhibit the behaviour. 
Hence, three groups of children are recognized: 
1. Abused children 
2. Non-abused children 
a. Non-abused children - exhibiting abuse-related behaviour  
b. Non-abused children - not exhibiting abuse-related behaviour 
By distinguishing between these groups in the analysis or Bayesian network, one can observe 
that two pieces of evidence that are individually uninformative with regards to the question of 
whether a child was abused can be very discriminative when evaluated together. A Bayesian 
network structure for this example is given in Figure 10. The (conditional) probability tables 
should account for the assumption that the behavioural pattern said to be characteristic of 
abused children is equally common among abused and non-abused children. In other words, 
observing this behaviour should not alter one’s belief in whether the child was abused. Only 
when evaluated in concurrence with an additional characteristic, the behaviour becomes 
highly probative. This can be mimicked in the probabilistic model from Figure 10 by setting the 
(conditional) probabilities to the values from Table 6 (for the equations that should be satisfied 
see Supplementary material, Section 1.3). Both pieces of evidence are, individually, 
uninformative with regards to whether a child was abused. They do, however, alter the 
posterior distribution among non-abused children exhibiting the abuse related behaviour. If 
one wouldn’t distinguish between non abused children that do exhibit this behaviour and only 
focus on the “ultimate” hypothesis, was this child abused, the Bayesian network representation 
is as in Figure 11. 
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Figure 10 Bayesian network for abuse example 
 
Figure 11 Bayesian network for abuse example, restricted view 
The Bayesian network in Figure 11 presents a restricted view of the abuse example and is at 
the core of the apparent paradox. Indeed, when evaluating the evidence based on the same 
(conditional) probabilities, the evidence, individually but also combined, suggests a LR of 1, 
while the “complete” overview shows the correct evaluation. 
The (conditional) probabilities from Table 6 capture the essence of this example. For the 
Bayesian network representing the restricted view from Figure 11, inserting the evidence will 
not alter the prior belief that a child was abused. For the “complete” representation in Figure 
10 does show the influence of evaluating the joint evidence with respect to the known sub-
categories of the non-abused group. The results are summarized in Table 7. 
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Table 6 Probability assignments for Abuse example 
Parameter  Probability 
assignment 
𝐏𝐫(abused) 0.4 
𝐏𝐫(non abused, exhibiting behaviour) 0.5 
𝐏𝐫(non abused, not exhibiting behaviour) 0.1 
𝐏𝐫(exhibiting behaviour | abused) 0.5 
𝐏𝐫(exhibiting behaviour | non abused, behaviour) 0.6 
𝐏𝐫(exhibiting behaviour | non abused, not behaviour) 0.0 
𝐏𝐫(additional characteristic | abused) 0.1 
𝐏𝐫(additional characteristic | non abused, behaviour) 0.0 
𝐏𝐫(additional characteristic | non abused, not behaviour) 0.6 
 
The Bayesian network simultaneously visualizes how to evaluate such a problem with 
subcategories for certain hypotheses (two groups of non-abused children) and allows for the 
effortless evaluation of the combined evidential value. Although it might be challenging to 
assess the necessary probabilities, it does identify the equalities that must hold and focuses 
on the dependency structure of the problem.  
Table 7 Posterior probabilities restricted and complete model 
 Posterior probability abused 
Evidence Restricted model  
(Figure 11) 
Complete model  
(Figure 10) 
none 40% 40% 
Exhibiting behaviour 40% 40% 
Additional characteristic 40% 40% 
Exhibiting behaviour AND 
additional characteristic 
40% 100% 
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4.4 Poison example 
This example is based on a similar example in (Achinstein, 2001). Here, the wording from 
(Pardo, 2013) is used. Like the food tray example, a situation is described in which a 
straightforward, simple, analysis of the evidence is insufficient to evaluate the situation as a 
whole. Furthermore, contrary to the previous examples, the presented paradox does not rely 
on an apparent likelihood ratio value equal to 1. 
The Prosecution alleges that Victim died of poisoning, and Defendant contends that 
Victim died from some other cause. There is evidence that at 12:00 p.m. on the day 
he collapsed and died, Victim’s lunch contained a poison that is fatal for ninety percent 
of the people who ingest it. Suppose there is also evidence that at 12:30 p.m., Victim 
ingested a second poison concealed in a drink that completely counteracts the first 
poison; however, it is fatal for eighty percent of the people who ingest it. 
Pardo notes (Pardo, 2013), 
Is evidence of the second poison relevant for proving that Victim died of poisoning? 
Yes, of course. Articulating exactly why, however, is critical for understanding the 
potential analytic gap between epistemic relevance and probability. (…) 
(…) First, because the evidence lowers the probability [that Victim died of poisoning], 
it is also relevant for disproving that Victim died of poisoning. (…) but this, by 
hypothesis, was not the Prosecutor’s theory of relevance for seeking to admit the 
evidence. 
First of all, it is insufficiently clarified in the example that both the eighty and the ninety percent 
should be regarded as prior probabilities that someone would die after ingesting the poison. 
This prior should be updated after observing the “evidence” that the victim died. Furthermore, 
in order to determine the posterior probability that the victim died of poisoning a prior 
probability for dying due to some other cause is required. For example, if we assume that the 
probability of dying due to some other cause is 10% (which presumably is rather large), the 
posterior probability that the victim died of poisoning after “inserting” the evidence that the 
victim died is 99% (based on a probability of 90% of dying due to ingesting the poison. 
Similarly, when the probability that one dies due to ingesting the poison is 80%, this posterior 
probability drops to 98%. 
This does not solve the issue with the fact that the posterior probability drops after “inserting” 
the evidence that the second meal also contained a poison. However, the notion that the 
second poison is “of course” relevant for proving that Victim died of poisoning and, 
furthermore, that is should be relevant in terms of supporting the Prosecution’s theory requires 
a careful consideration of what should be treated as “uncertain”. An example of such a 
situation is presented in Figure 12. 
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Figure 12 Victim dies of poisoning basic network 
Pardo (Pardo, 2013) further states (page 584): 
Alternatively, the probabilist defender may also attempt to recharacterize the example 
so that it supports the Prosecution’s theory while also resulting in an increase in 
probability. For example, we might separate the two effects of the second poison as 
two distinct pieces of evidence: counteracting the first poison and causing death. 
Under this reinterpretation, the first piece of evidence lowers the probability to zero 
percent and, then, the second piece of evidence raises the probability to 0.8, thus 
making the evidence relevant and raising the probability. This type of ad hoc 
recharacterization suggests that there may indeed be creative ways to make the 
probabilistic conception fit with epistemic relevance. 
Here, it is suggested that it should be possible to treat the different pieces of evidence 
sequentially, i.e. by first evaluating the change in posterior probability of the first piece of 
evidence, determining whether it is `relevant’ based on the influence it has on the probability 
distribution and repeating this for the next piece of evidence. However, this often does not 
contribute to a clear understanding of the joint evidential value of the pieces of evidence. In 
this example, if it is absolutely certain that the victim ingested both poisons, then the probability 
that those combined poisons are lethal is 80%. If it is known that the first poison is completely 
counteracted, it is nonsensical to consider the probability of 90% for the first meal as a relevant 
probability, i.e. any other probability assignment would lead to the same result. Pardo’s 
discussion seems to conflate and confuse two different hypotheses: 
 determining whether poison was the cause of death (normally the domain of a 
coroner’s court)  
 determining whether the defendant intended to poison the victim (the domain of a 
criminal court)  
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These are, of course, different.  If we were to focus on the second of these (which, for 
simplicity, we will not do in what follows) then having the two pieces of poison evidence is 
clearly relevant even though the first may be irrelevant in determining cause of death.   
If one is certain that the evidence should be probative for establishing the prosecution 
hypothesis, a very careful consideration is needed. In (Pardo, 2013) it is stated, in relation with 
the explanatory conception method that, 
The second poisoning is part of the prosecution’s explanation of what occurred. Even 
if the evidence lowers the probability of poisoning from the probability prior to its 
introduction, it nonetheless provides evidence that supports, or provides a reason to 
believe, the prosecution’s explanation. It is relevant. 
This can definitely be the case and, furthermore, can be made visible using a probabilistic 
model. However, such a model requires careful consideration of the relevant uncertainties. A 
Bayesian network structure can help create awareness for the necessity of these parameters 
and it forces us to specify why and how certain pieces of evidence are relevant in establishing 
a certain hypothesis.  
If it is certain that both meal 1 and meal 2 contained poison, but there exists uncertainty 
regarding whether the victim ate those meals, like in Table 8, the probability that the victim 
was poisoned increases once one introduces the second meal as evidence.  
Table 8 Probability assignments for numeric example 
Parameter Assignment  
𝑷𝒓(victim is dead | victim not poisoned) 0.10 
𝑷𝒓(victim ate meal 1) 0.80 
𝑷𝒓(victim ate meal 2) 0.80 
𝑷𝒓(meal 1 contained poison) 1.00 
𝑷𝒓(meal 2 contained poison) 1.00 
Posterior probability 97% 
 
Using the (conditional) probabilities from Table 8 for the model in Figure 13, the posterior 
probability that the victim was poisoned is 96% without the second meal as evidence. Once 
the second meal is introduced, the posterior probability increases to 97%. Hence, for this 
formalization of the example and the associated uncertainties, the second meal is, of course, 
relevant for proving that the victim died of poisoning. Here, key is that it is unequivocally clear 
why the second meal increases one’s belief. The uncertainties and the relation between them 
are formalized. 
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Figure 13 Poison network - additional uncertainties 
Note that the Bayesian network structure in Figure 13 represents one of the many possible 
models for this problem. As previously discussed, if the focus was to determine whether the 
defendant intended to poison the victim (as opposed to simply determining the cause of death) 
one could include: the intent of the person that placed the poisons and whether the same 
person was responsible for the first and the second poison as nodes to the network. Again, a 
Bayesian network could serve as the model that presents the assumed relation between 
relevant hypotheses and evidence.   
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5 Conclusions and recommendations 
The arguments that have been used to support the idea that the various puzzles produce 
supposed probability paradoxes are based on the following fundamental misunderstandings:  
1. That it is possible to evaluate the evidence in isolation without taking into account the 
impact of the evidence on other relevant hypotheses in the case. 
2. That evidence that is useful for each of two contradictory hypotheses is not relevant.  
(This is false because it could be more useful for one hypothesis than the other.) 
3. Speaking of “the LR” as if there is only one LR for each item of evidence. 
4. Equating LR = 1 for a certain set of hypotheses with a claim that the evidence is 
irrelevant for the case as a whole. 
According to Pardo (Pardo, 2013), an ideal methodology for handling evidence appropriately 
must satisfy: the “micro level”- that of individual evidence; the “macro” level- that of narrative 
or story; and the “integration constraint”- individual evidence must be integrated into their wider 
story context. Bayesian networks satisfy these constraints, and so provide an appropriate 
formal framework for use in a legal setting. We have shown that, by modelling the puzzles as 
Bayesian networks, the claimed probabilistic ‘paradoxes’ in each case are easily discredited.  
Moreover, when these models are used properly they can help prevent logical blunders 
commonly made when reasoning with evidence.    
It is also desirable that a method for handling evidence is flexible- allowing one to try out 
different stories, to change assumptions, and to refine and develop a model for a given set of 
evidences. Bayesian networks provide this flexibility. Moreover, Bayesian networks are being 
increasingly used in practice to help forensic scientists assess the impact of their evidence   - 
see, for example (Kokshoorn, Blankers, de Zoete, & Berger, 2017; Taroni, Aitken, Garbolino, 
& Biedermann, 2014; Taylor, Biedermann, Hicks, & Champod, 2018)   - and to help legal 
practitioners understand the overall impact of combined evidence – see for example  (de 
Zoete, Sjerps, & Meester, 2017; Edwards, 1991; Lagnado, Fenton, & Neil, 2013; Taylor et al., 
2018).  
As with any methodology, Bayesian networks have not been perfected to the point where they 
can adequately model all legal situations.  However, this need not deter us from attempting 
such a formal framework for evidence.  Without such a framework, it is easy to ignore implicit 
assumptions, and we would have little basis beyond untutored intuition for combining and 
weighing multiple items of evidence such as we see in many, if not most, cases. Furthermore, 
by explicitly framing what evidence and which hypotheses are considered one does not have 
to speak of “the” LR in broad terms because the underlying assumptions for “their” LR are 
explicit.  
Some legal professionals may feel discouraged from using any kind of probability theory in 
legal cases because they do not wish to “put a number” on doubt or belief. It is worthwhile 
recalling that Bayesian networks are useful primarily as models of how events relate to one 
another, rather than as a guilt-calculator, throwing out an infallible number for judgement. Also, 
this method is tractable, and accommodates uncertainty; it is unnecessary to commit to a 
single “point value” for a probability when this is not appropriate. Furthermore, if a line of legal 
reasoning does not make use of such a formal framework, this does not prevent the necessity 
of assumptions or banish uncertainty.  
A particular advantage of using Bayesian nets is that they are visual, making this methodology 
more intuitive to non-mathematicians. Importantly, for any user of Bayesian nets, the process 
of building invites interrogation at every stage of construction, and assumptions at each step 
are more easily identified than with non-visual methods. They are useful as maps of how 
events are related; as maps of belief and doubt; and as a tool for considering a case fully, 
integrating story, real-world context, and evidence.  
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We have shown that by using a Bayesian network to structure these legal paradoxes 
evaluating the combined evidential value can be done effortlessly. Furthermore, when 
evidence is only indirectly relevant for the hypothesis of interest, i.e. when it is relevant for 
another, related, pair of hypotheses, a Bayesian network can be used to make this connection 
visual. Even in situations where exact probability assignments are difficult or even impossible 
to assign due to the nature of the evidence or a disagreement amongst the involved parties, 
the structured probability model does allow users to establish whether a piece of evidence is 
relevant regardless of the exact values. Most importantly, by disentangling the dependency 
relations between distinct hypotheses and pieces of evidence, it can be shown that common 
examples of probabilistic paradoxes in legal reasoning only exist due to the restricted view 
with which they are approached and not because of the underlying probabilistic concept of 
“relevant evidence”.  
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Supplementary material 
 
In this supplementary material to Resolving the so-called “probabilistic paradoxes in legal 
reasoning” with Bayesian Networks Section 1 deals with derivations to posterior probabilities 
presented in the main manuscript. 
Furthermore, in addition to the probabilistic paradoxes in legal reasoning mentioned in the 
manuscript, three more examples (“Lottery”, “Liberal candidates” and “Typewriter”) are worked 
out in a similar way. 
7 Derivation of posterior probabilities 
7.1 DNA example Section 2, Figure 2. 
H1: defendant is the source of DNA found at crime scene 
H2: brother of defendant is the source of DNA found at crime scene 
H3: an unrelated other is the source of DNA found at crime scene 
E1: Defendant DNA matches that found at the crime scene 
E2: Eyewitness claims brother was out of town on day of the crime 
Pr(H1|E1) =
Pr(E1|H1) ∙ Pr(H1)
Pr(E1|H1) ∙ Pr(H1) + Pr(E1|H2) ∙ Pr(H2) + Pr(E1|H3) ∙ Pr(H3)
 
=
1 ∙ 0.01
1 ∙ 0.01 + 0.1 ∙ 0.01 + 0.98 ∙ 0.001
 
= 500 599⁄  
Pr(H2|E1) =
Pr(E1|H2) ∙ Pr(H2)
Pr(E1|H1) ∙ Pr(H1) + Pr(E1|H2) ∙ Pr(H2) + Pr(E1|H3) ∙ Pr(H3)
 
=
0.1 ∙ 0.01
1 ∙ 0.01 + 0.1 ∙ 0.01 + 0.98 ∙ 0.001
 
= 50 599⁄  
Pr(H3|E1) =
Pr(E1|H3) ∙ Pr(H3)
Pr(E1|H1) ∙ Pr(H1) + Pr(E1|H2) ∙ Pr(H2) + Pr(E1|H3) ∙ Pr(H3)
 
=
0.001 ∙ 0.98
1 ∙ 0.01 + 0.1 ∙ 0.01 + 0.98 ∙ 0.001
 
= 49 599⁄  
Pr(H1|E1,E2) = Pr({H1|E1}|E2) 
=
Pr(E2|{H1|E1}) × Pr({H1|E1})
Pr(E2)
 
=  
Pr(E2|{H1|E1}) × Pr({H1|E1})
Pr(E2|{H1|E1}) × Pr(H1|E1) +  Pr(E2|{H2, 𝐸1}) × Pr(H2|E1)  + Pr(E2|{𝐻3|𝐸1}) × Pr(H3|E1)
 
=  
Pr(E2|H1) × Pr({H1|E1})
Pr(E2|H1) × Pr(H1|E1) +  Pr(E2|H2) × Pr(H2|E1)  + Pr(E2|H3) × Pr(H3|E1)
 
=  
0.9 × 500/599
0.9 × 500/599 +  0.1 × 50 599⁄ + 0.9 ×
49
599⁄
=
4500
4991
 
= 0.90 
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7.2 Twins problem Section 4.1 Figure 6 
For how to evaluate the LR when one of the hypothesis consists of several sub-hypotheses, 
see (de Zoete & Sjerps, 2018). 
 
𝐿𝑅 =
Pr (𝐸|defendant)
Pr(𝐸| 𝑛𝑜𝑡 defendant)
 
 =
1
(
Pr(𝐸|twin) ∙ Pr(twin) + Pr(𝐸|someone else) ∙ Pr(someone else)
Pr(twin) + Pr(someone else)
)
 
=
1
(1 ∙ 1
3
+ 0 ∙ 1
3
)
1
3
+ 1
3
 
= 2 
 
7.3 Abuse example Section 4.3 Figure 10 
 
𝐻0 = abused 
𝐻1 = non-abused children-exhibiting abuse-related behaviour 
𝐻2 = non-abused children- not exhibiting abuse-related behaviour 
 
 
𝐸1 = exhibiting behaviour 
𝐸2 = additional characteristic 
The following equality should hold for the “exhibiting behaviour” evidence.  
Pr(𝐻0)
Pr(𝐻1) + Pr(𝐻2)
=
Pr(𝐻0) ∙ Pr (𝐸1|𝐻0)
Pr(𝐻1) ∙ Pr(𝐸1|𝐻1) + Pr(𝐻2) ∙ Pr(𝐸1|𝐻2)
 
The same can be achieved for the additional characteristic evidence. 
Pr(𝐻0)
Pr(𝐻1) + Pr(𝐻2)
=
Pr(𝐻0) ∙ Pr (𝐸2|𝐻0)
Pr(𝐻1) ∙ Pr(𝐸2|𝐻1) + Pr(𝐻2) ∙ Pr(𝐸2|𝐻2)
 
 
The equations hold for the (conditional) probabilities from Figure 10 in the manuscript. 
 
0.4
0.5 + 0.1
=
0.4 ∙ 0.4
0.5 ∙ 0.6 + 0.1 ∙ 0.0
 
and, 
0.4
0.5 + 0.1
=
0.4 ∙ 0.1
0.5 ∙ 0 + 0.1 ∙ 0.6
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8 Additional probabilistic paradoxes in legal reasoning 
8.1 Lottery example 
The lottery example, which is introduced in (Pardo, 2013) is very similar to the twins problem 
from Section 4.1 of the manuscript. Again, a likelihood ratio equal to 1 for a certain set of 
hypotheses is used interchangeably with the notion that the evidence is irrelevant for the case 
as a whole.  
Victim was murdered. The motive appears to be that Victim ran an illegal lottery and 
refused to pay the winner. It is unknown who actually won the lottery. The Prosecution 
claims it was Defendant, and Defendant claims it was Rival. Defendant purchased one 
of the one thousand total lottery tickets and Rival purchased ninety-nine tickets. 
Suppose there is also evidence that the other nine hundred tickets were never sold 
and have been accounted for. 
Generally, Pardo recognizes three problems with a probabilistic conception of relevance and 
probative value 
1. “overlapping” evidence that is relevant but does not distinguish between the cases 
probabilistically; 
2. relevant evidence that does not coincide with increases (or decreases) in probability; 
3. the reference-class problem. 
The lottery example is presented as an example of the second “problem”. Even though this 
example seems especially convenient for a probabilistic approach because the most important 
evidence, i.e. the ticket distribution, can conveniently be converted into probabilities, it is noted 
that, 
Here, the probability that Defendant was the winner of the lottery (and thus is guilty) 
went from 1 in 1000 to 1 in 100 with the introduction of the evidence about the nine 
hundred tickets. Despite this increase in probability, the evidence does not provide 
epistemic support for proving Defendant’s guilt. 
Where epistemic support is defined in (Pardo, 2013) as, 
By “epistemic support” throughout this Article, I mean evidence that provides some 
reason to believe that a particular proposition is true or false. This support need not 
provide a conclusive reason and it may or may not provide epistemic justification for 
beliefs about the proposition. 
There is a contradiction here. As mentioned by Pardo, the probability that Defendant was the 
winner of the lottery went from 1 in 1000 to 1 in 100. Similarly, the probability that Rival won 
the lottery went from 99 in 1000 to 99 in 100. Hence, if epistemic support is defined as 
evidence providing some reason to believe that a particular proposition is true of false it seems 
to be that this evidence provides epistemic support for both the defendant’s and the 
prosecution’s claim. However, similar to the Twins problem, it is noted that in light of the 
hypotheses “defendant won the lottery” and “rival won the lottery” the likelihood ratio of the 
evidence is 1, and therefore “irrelevant”. Pardo continues: 
(…) a defender of the probabilistic conception may respond by either offering 
alternative theories of relevance, (e.g., it is relevant for proving guilt because it 
eliminates nine hundred other possibilities) or offering a recharacterization consistent 
with the analysis (e.g., it increases the probability of Rival’s guilt and, hence, defendant 
innocence, (…) 
What is referred to as “alternative theories of relevance” should be regarded as evaluating the 
evidence based on another set of hypotheses. As defenders of the probabilistic conception, 
we disagree with “increases the probability of Rival’s guilt and, hence, defendant’s innocence”. 
This is a perfect example showing that one should be careful when the hypotheses are not 
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exhaustive, i.e. when the hypotheses do not cover all possible situations. The restricted view 
of the situation, where one only considers the defendant and the rival as potential lottery 
winners, as in Figure 14, cannot be used to properly update the probability that either of them 
won the lottery. The posterior probability in such a scenario is only relevant when one explicitly 
assumes that the hypotheses are exhaustive. If not, the likelihood ratio could inaccurately 
suggest that evidence is “irrelevant” or that it provides substantial belief for one hypotheses 
only because some options are not taken into account. 
 
Figure 14 Bayesian network for lottery example - two hypotheses 
Due to the use of a non-exhaustive set of hypotheses, one could inaccurately state that an 
increase in belief of one hypotheses should cause a decrease for the alternative. Indeed, this 
evidence does increase the belief that rival won the lottery, but similarly, it increases the belief 
that the defendant won the lottery. However, in terms of odds, they are still equally likely. 
Interestingly, in (Pardo, 2013), an alternative method that we will refer to as explanatory 
conception method, provides the following conclusion for the nine hundred unsold tickets 
evidence. 
The evidence about the nine hundred tickets supports Defendant’s explanation that 
Rival was the culprit. Even though it raises the probability that Defendant is the culprit 
from the probability prior to its introduction, it supports, or provides a reason to believe, 
Defendant’s explanation (Rival did it). 
This raises some questions. The probabilistic approach would, regardless of the ticket 
distribution among defendant, rival and other tickets, always indicate that evidence that 
other tickets were never sold and have been accounted for is relevant. It increases the 
belief that defendant as well as the rival won the lottery while leaving the odds between 
them unchanged. However, for the explanatory conception method the prior distribution of 
tickets appears to be the determining factor when establishing whether the unsold tickets 
evidence supports the defendant’s explanation, the rival’s explanation or neither. If the 
defendant owned 99 tickets and the rival only 1, the conclusion should be the opposite. 
And how to account for situations where the defendant and the rival have an equal amount 
of tickets? 
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Table 9 presents the influence of the number of tickets on the LR given two different sets of 
hypotheses.  
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Table 9 Influence of total number of tickets for the LR given two sets of hypotheses. 
Hypothesis pair: Defendant won the lottery vs 
Rival won the lottery 
Defendant won the lottery vs 
Someone else won the lottery 
Total number of 
tickets: 
LR for unsold ticket evidence 
100 1 1 
200 1 2 
500 1 5 
900 1 9 
 
8.2 Liberal candidates example 
Another example where a LR of 1 is recognized for evidence that intuitively appears to be 
relevant is the liberal candidates example. Originally presented as an example of irrelevant 
evidence in (Lempert, 1977) but also brought forward in (Pardo, 2013). 
In a criminal trial, there is evidence that the defendant supports liberal political 
candidates. Absent some reason to believe that liberals are more prone to commit the 
crime in question, the probability that the defendant could have been shown to be 
liberal were he guilty is (...) the same as the probability that he could have been shown 
to be a liberal were he not guilty.  
Pardo states  
In any given trial, there may be evidence that each side claims supports its theory (or 
story) of what happened, (…). In other words, the evidence will form an integral part of 
each side’s proof, but there may be no reason to believe that the likelihood ratio for 
that evidence is anything other than 1. Like the Liberal Candidates example, any 
conclusion to the contrary would be sheer speculation. Unlike that example, however, 
the evidence may still be relevant precisely because it forms an integral part of each 
side’s explanation as to what happened. 
This conclusion is inaccurate. The fallacy is that it is assumed that, in order to determine the 
likelihood ratio, the evidence should directly, and without taking any other evidence into 
account, influence the ultimate question, for example “who is the offender”, i.e. as in the 
network in Figure 15. Here, as a concrete example, we will consider the liberal candidates 
example where it is assumed that the evidence that the defendant supports liberal candidates 
does form an integral part of each side’s explanation as to what happened. 
 
Figure 15 Two node Liberal candidates example network 
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If the evidence forms an integral part of each side’s proof, the fact that the defendant supports 
liberal candidates is, presumably, relevant for proving another element which, in turn, is 
relevant for the case as a whole. As an example, consider the situation that at the moment 
the crime took place a liberal candidate was holding a rally in the same town as the offence. 
It is unknown whether the defendant was present at this rally, but the defence claims he was 
and uses the fact that he supports liberal candidates to strengthen their argument.  Similarly, 
the prosecution knows of a similar offense a week earlier for which they have evidence that 
the offender was a liberal. Hence, using the similarity between the cases, they want to 
establish that the defendant is the offender of both offences. A Bayesian network representing 
this situation is given in Figure 16. 
 
Figure 16 Bayesian network for the broader Liberal candidates example 
This Bayesian network combines the stories of both the prosecution and the defence, and the 
likelihood ratio of the evidence can be evaluated based on the (conditional) probabilities 
assigned to all the events. Like in the examples presented in the main manuscript, it is unlikely 
that an agreement can be reached with regards to what the relevant conditional probabilities 
should be. However, for practically all possible assignments, the likelihood ratio of the 
evidence will not be 1. Some numerical examples are derived below. 
The initial model, as used in the example (see Figure 15), disregards the fact that the 
defendant supports liberal candidates is an integral part of the stories presented by the 
prosecution and the defence. Similar to the typewriter example, see Section 8.3, it is important 
to consider other, related, questions when evaluating the value or relevance of a piece 
evidence. Hence, a broader perspective is often necessary to obtain an overview of how 
different pieces of evidence influence the ultimate question. As Pardo notes, 
Moreover, in some cases there will be good reasons to believe evidence is relevant 
when the likelihood ratio implies that it is irrelevant. 
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Here, and also in the abuse example (see Section 4.3 of the manuscript), it is shown that a 
careful consideration of what the evidence implies and how it influences the questions of 
interest often requires an overview that can conveniently be obtained by structuring the 
problem as a Bayesian network. Most importantly, the more inclusive version of the model 
shows that the evidence is relevant even within a probabilistic conception of evidence and 
proof. Furthermore, it is possible to quantify the probative value as a function of parameters 
that are relevant when assessing the evidence.  
Contrary to the statement that any likelihood ratio other than 1 would be sheer speculation, 
the opposite is true. Since the evidence forms an integral part of each side’s proof and even 
though there is no reason to believe that liberals are more prone to commit the crime in 
question, it is sheer speculation to deem the likelihood ratio of this evidence 1 prior to 
establishing both standpoints. Only a restricted view of the likelihood ratio approach, where 
the evidence is evaluated with regards to the single hypothesis pair “guilty” vs “innocent” 
results in the short-sighted conclusion that the evidence is irrelevant. It is not the likelihood 
ratio approach itself but the restricted view of this approach that causes the evidence to be 
labelled “irrelevant”. 
Table 10 presents several probability assignments and the resulting likelihood ratio for the 
example from Figure 16. As evidence it is inserted that the defendant supports liberal 
candidates. 
Table 10 Parameter assignments for Liberal candidates example network 
Parameter Probability 
assignment - 1 
Probability 
assignment - 2 
𝑷𝒓(defendant is liberal ) 0.20 0.20 
𝑷𝒓(same offender) 0.50 0.50 
𝑷𝒓(offender previous week liberal ) 0.92 0.33 
𝑷𝒓(defendant supp. liberal candidates | defendant is liberal ) 1.00 1.00 
𝑷𝒓(defendant supp. liberal candidates | defendant is NOT liberal  ) 0.01 0.01 
𝑷𝒓(defendant at political rally | defendant is liberal ) 0.50 0.50 
𝑷𝒓(defendant at political rally | defendant is NOT liberal ) 0.00 0.00 
Size of offender population 100 100 
Likelihood ratio 1.5 0.75 
 
The first set of probability assignments results in a likelihood ratio > 1, i.e. supporting the 
prosecution hypothesis that the defendant committed the crime in question. The second set 
results in a likelihood ratio supporting the defence hypothesis. Even though it is unlikely that 
an agreement will be reached over the proper values for the necessary parameters, the 
Bayesian network does show that it is practically impossible that the likelihood ratio of the 
evidence is 1. 
  
41 
 
8.3 Typewriter example 
From (Cohen, 1977)  
Suppose that A is accused of murdering B and that part of the evidence against A is a 
threatening letter found in B’s house which, though unsigned, has been typewritten on 
a machine that has the same peculiarities (broken or twisted type) as A’s typewriter. 
More specifically, suppose there is expert evidence asserting the presence of just three 
mutually independent peculiarities in the machine on which the letter was typed, … 
[and] expert evidence is that each of these peculiarities is normally found, on average, 
in only one out of ten machines. Then, if this evidence is correct, the mathematical 
probability of a typewriter having all three peculiarities will be 0.001.  
Contrary to the presented examples so far, there is no paradox here. However, this is a perfect 
example of how Bayesian networks can assist in the evaluation of evidence. It is similar to 
both the twins and the lottery example in the sense that alternative hypotheses under which 
the evidence should be evaluated are considered. Contrary to these examples, the likelihood 
ratio of the evidence is not equal to 1. Cohen points out several ways in which this evidence 
may be unsatisfactory: 
1. What if the three peculiarities in the typewriter used are more likely in the typewriters 
of B's acquaintances, than in typewriters from a random sample? 
2. What if someone else used A's machine? 
3. What is A was coerced into typing the letter? 
4. What if someone else than the letter-writer murdered B? 
The points raised by Cohen all present a more complicated yet realistic scenario for evaluating 
the evidence. The three peculiarties of the typewriter can only be used to make statements 
about the likelihood that A’s typewriter was used (a comparison at source level (Cook, Evett, 
Jackson, Jones, & Lambert, 1998), whereas, from a legal point of view, one is interested in 
who murdered B, an hypothesis at offense level). By constructing a Bayesian network, one 
can take all of Cohen’s points into account and an evaluation with regards to who is the 
offender can be made.  
Cohen’s first point discusses whether the average of 1 out of 10 typewriters that show an 
individual peculiarity also holds for typewriters belonging to B’s acquaintances, i.e. should 
another likelihood be used for machines belonging to acquaintances. If there is good reason 
to distinguish between typewriters owned by the group of people on which the average is 
based and the group of acquaintances of B, another average can be used. In a Bayesian 
network representation this can be accounted for by distinguishing between (1) Suspect A 
being the offender, (2) an acquaintance of B being the offender and (3) someone else being 
the offender in the offender node, see Figure 17. 
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Figure 17 Bayesian network for Typewriter example 
Cohen’s second to fourth point all consider different uncertainties with regards to links from 
the offender to the typewriter that was used to type the threatening letter. 
Cohen’s second point identifies the problem that someone else could have used A’s 
typewriter. Hence, one needs to distinguish between the typewriter and the author, i.e. how 
likely is it that the typewriter was used by it’s owner. This uncertainty can be modeled with an 
extra node. 
Cohen’s third point considers whether the author of the letter was coerced into typing the letter, 
i.e., how likely is it that the author of the letter also provided the content of the letter. The 
Bayesian network provides a convenient and insightful way of incorporating this uncertainty 
by adding a node. 
Cohen’s last point distinguishes between the source of the letter and the actual offender, i.e. 
it is not certain that the person that provided the content of the letter is also the offender, or 
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how likely is it that the source of the content of the letter is the offender. This uncertainty is 
also incorporated by adding an additional node.   
Suppose that the prior probability that the suspect is the offender is set to 0.05, the prior 
probability that an acquaintance of B is the offender to 0.20 and the prior probability that it was 
someone else to 0.75. Now, if the other parameters are set as in Table 11, 
Table 11 Probability assignments for typewriter Bayesian network 
Parameter Probability 
assignment - 
1  
Probability 
assignment - 
2 
𝑷𝒓([content] is [offender]) 0.90 0.80 
𝑷𝒓([content] is [author]) 0.95 0.80 
𝑷𝒓([author] is [typewriter]) 0.95 0.75 
𝑷𝒓(peculiarity 1 | acquaintance of B) 0.20 0.50 
𝑷𝒓(peculiarity 2 | acquaintance of B) 0.20 0.50 
𝑷𝒓(peculiarity 3 | acquaintance of B) 0.20 0.50 
Posterior probability 65% 21% 
 
the posterior probability that suspect is the offender, after inserting the typewriter peculiarity 
evidence, as calculated by the Bayesian network becomes 65%. This number is substantially 
less discriminative than the mathematical probability of a typewriter having all three 
peculiarities of 0.001; however, it is substantially more informative with regards to the question 
who murdered B. Furthermore, the Bayesian network representation allows for a quick re-
evaluation with different probability assignments. For example, another evaluation with the 
probability assignments as the second set in Table 11 results in a posterior probability of 21%. 
Most importantly, by structuring the problem using a Bayesian network, one can examine the 
influence of parameters such as the probability that the source of the letter is the offender 
and/or the probability of observing the specific peculiarities in typewriters belonging to 
acquaintances of B.  
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